




t’s a great pleasure and honor for me to be invited to participate in this
Forum, althoughIhavetotellyouthatIwasmorethanalittleintimidated
whenIlearnedthatIwouldbepartofapanelfeaturingBobKingandTom
Sargent. Itakesomecomfort, however, fromwhatMikeDotseytoldmewhen
he ﬁrst contacted me about this program seven or eight months ago. He said
thepanelwouldfocusonoptimalmonetarypolicy,buthewasn’texpectingme
to provide a highly technical analysis, or even a low-tech analysis. Instead, he
wantedmetotalkabouthowI,asonefairlyseniorFedmonetarypolicymaker,
use economic analysis and principles to arrive at policy positions and then
present and defend them. This I think I can do, although I still feel a little
uneasy with Bob and Tom so close at hand.
The ﬁrst thing I need to say is that I do try to base my policy positions on
solid economic analyses, as do my FOMC colleagues. And throughout my
11-year tenure as Richmond Fed president I’ve been blessed with exceptional
policy advisors and a strong research staff who’ve made this possible. My
principal policy advisor, Marvin Goodfriend, is well known to all of you, I’m
sure. Our research director, Jeff Lacker, Bob Hetzel, and several other mem-
bers of our staff provide strong support. Mike Dotsey was an important part
of our policy team before the Philadelphia Fed got lucky and he moved up
here. Finally, we’ve developed long-term advisory relationships with several
leading university economists, most notably, Bob King and Ben McCallum.
All of these people have helped keep me reasonably abreast of ongoing re-
search in monetary economics, and, appropriately, they’ve insisted—some
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more vociferously than others—that I take advantage of what I’ve learned
from them in formulating my policy positions. I’ve been happy to try to
oblige.
Every once in a while I’ve heard people—including people close to and
knowledgeable about the monetary policymaking process—opine that eco-
nomic principles are not terribly important in the practical, day-to-day con-
ductofpolicy. Sure,they’llacknowledge,it’sniceforcentralbankstosupport
economic research related to policy and for staff economists to summarize the
latestacademicthinkingforpolicymakerssothatpolicymakerscanparticipate
effectively in policy discussions and debates with academic economists, the
press, and others. But when the chips are down, the argument goes, and the
FOMCsetsthetargetlevelforthefederalfundsrate, thedecisioncomesdown
to two things: (1) assessing what the latest economic and ﬁnancial informa-
tion says about the current condition of the economy and its prospects, and
(2) determining how promptly and how strongly to respond to this informa-
tion. Moreover, these judgments are strongly inﬂuenced by where the major
economic indicators are expected to be in the period ahead in relation to their
ranges in the past, and they are made with a generous amount of instinct and
common sense.
Now there is more than a little truth in this characterization. I’ve been
attending FOMC meetings at least part of the time since 1973, and I have
certainly heard this view expressed in one way or another from time-to-time
in the Committee’s deliberations. Indeed, I’ve probably made comments like
this myself.
It would be inaccurate and misleading, however, to suggest that this atti-
tude has been a dominant one in the Committee either currently or in the past.
Onthecontrary,economicanalysis—includingrelativelyrecentdevelopments
in the professional economics literature—has frequently played a central role
in determining policy, especially over the longer run. Unquestionably one of
the Fed’s greatest achievements over the last three decades was our role in,
ﬁrst, breaking the high inﬂation of the late 1970s and early ’80s and, subse-
quently, helping bring the rate down to its current quite low level. The view
that there was no exploitable systematic tradeoff between inﬂation and un-
employment, which was gaining ground in the profession throughout the 70s,
paved the way for this accomplishment. And the quantity theory corollary
that central banks could control inﬂation by controlling money growth was its
foundation.
ProbablythebestwayIcandescribehowIuseeconomicsasapolicymaker
is to provide a few concrete examples drawn from my personal participation
in FOMC meetings. (This may seem a bit self-centered, and I apologize if
it does, but I think this is the best way for me to make the points I want to
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are released to the public ﬁve years after a meeting.1 Consequently, meeting
transcripts are currently available through the meeting held December 16,
1997,whichcoverstheﬁrst40meetingsIattendedasRichmondFedpresident.
I’ve reviewed these transcripts and selected three examples of how economic
analysis guided my own thinking. The ﬁrst involves my role in a “debate”
regarding inﬂation targeting at the January 31–February 1, 1995, meeting.
The second concerns my argument a few months earlier at the November 15,
1994, meeting that in principle the Fed should disengage as far as possible
from foreign exchange market intervention. The ﬁnal example comes from
theMay20,1997,meetingwhenIarguedthatanincreaseintrendproductivity
growth has important implications for interest rate policy not recognized by
the macroeconomic models we typically use for monetary policy analysis.
In each case, I will describe brieﬂy the context in which the policy issue
came up and discuss the macroeconomic principle that guided my approach
to the issue in question. Then, using the transcripts of the relevant FOMC
meeting, I will describe how I used the principle as a basis for a policy recom-
mendation. As always, the views that follow are my own and not necessarily
thoseofanyofmyFOMCcolleagues. Thisis,ofcourse,astandarddisclaimer
that FOMC participants routinely recite. In this case, I have proof that my
views are not necessarily those of my colleagues. Even a cursory reading of
the relevant transcripts will make that abundantly clear.
1. INFLATION TARGETING (JANUARY 31–FEBRUARY 1, 1995,
FOMC MEETING)
As you will remember, the ﬁrst several quarters of the recovery from the
1990-91 recession were quite sluggish compared to most post-World War II
recoveries up to that point. Real GDP grew at only a 2.6 percent annual rate
from the trough in the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 through mid-year 1993. Moreover,
likethepresentrecovery,itfeaturedveryweakgrowthinjobs,forwhichitalso
earned the sobriquet “jobless.” In early 1994, however, the weakness in the
economy began to abate, and the recovery gained momentum. By this time
the CPI inﬂation rate had declined to 3 percent. To stimulate the recovery
further, the Committee held the nominal funds rate at 3 percent for over a
year. With inﬂation at 3 percent, the real funds rate was therefore zero. Most
FOMC members2 agreed that 3 percent inﬂation was not quite price stability,
and probably everyone recognized that a zero real funds rate was inconsistent
with containing inﬂation over the long run. Still, with the recovery only
1 The transcripts are available on the Board of Governors website at www.federalreserve.gov/
fomc/transcripts.
2 Throughout this paper, references to FOMC members include non-voting as well as voting
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beginning to accelerate as the year began, the strategy was to hold the line on
inﬂation that year and then make the ﬁnal step to price stability later.
The year 1994—my ﬁrst as a voting member—turned out to be a moment
of truth, or maybe I should say a year of truth, for the FOMC in the long
ﬁght for price stability. We were tested on two counts. First, there was an
“inﬂationscare”inthebondmarket. The30-yearTreasurybondraterosefrom
a low of 5.9 percent in October 1993 to a peak of 8.2 percent in November
1994. Undoubtedly, a large portion of that increase reﬂected rising inﬂation
expectations. Financial markets were far from conﬁdent that the Fed would
succeed in containing inﬂation. Second, in February the Committee began to
announce its funds rate target immediately after each FOMC meeting. This
additional transparency meant that, henceforth, every interest rate action—or
lack of action—would be scrutinized and second-guessed by the markets as
never before.
In the event, we were able to raise the nominal funds rate by three per-
centage points between early 1994 and early 1995. And, since inﬂation held
steady, the real funds rate rose by roughly the same amount over this period.
The unemployment rate moved up following this tightening, but only slightly.
Moreover, the long bond rate returned to about 6 percent, and people actually
began to talk about the “death of inﬂation.” It seems fairly clear in retro-
spect that our actions anchored inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. But, as
we moved into 1995, I remember feeling that we’d been fortunate that we
had accomplished this and that our credibility for low inﬂation was still not
complete. The inﬂation scare in the bond market, in particular, made me think
thatwecouldstillﬁndourselvesinapositionsomewheredowntheroadwhere
we would have to tighten policy sharply to shore up our credibility, with an
attendant risk of setting off a recession.
It was in this context that I began to speak in FOMC meetings in favor of
aninﬂationtarget. TheinitialdiscussionseventuallyledChairmanGreenspan
to ask Governor JanetYellen and me to lead a “debate” on inﬂation targeting
at the January 1995 meeting. Janet spoke in opposition; I spoke in favor.
The analytical principle that conditioned my support for targeting—rooted in
the idea of rational expectations and reinforced strongly by discussions with
Marvin and Bob Hetzel—was that by announcing an explicit long-run inﬂa-
tion objective, the FOMC would enhance the credibility of its commitment to
low inﬂation and thereby reduce the risk that inﬂation would reaccelerate and,
shoulditdoso,reducethecostofbringingitbackdown. Inparticular,Iargued
that anchoring inﬂation expectations more strongly with an explicit inﬂation
objective would allow the FOMC to act more aggressively to help stabilize
the economy in the short run, since with an explicit inﬂation anchor the Com-
mittee would be less concerned that such actions would reduce credibility and
generate further inﬂation scares. In this environment, interest rate increases
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conversely, deep cuts in interest rates needed to stabilize the economy in a
recession would be less likely to set off an inﬂation scare.
Let me fast-forward for a moment to the present. Inﬂation targeting has
been receiving renewed attention recently. In the 1995 “debate,” for a variety
of reasons, I was willing to settle for an inﬂation objective that didn’t nec-
essarily include a numerical target. I felt that an FOMC commitment to the
language of the proposed Neal Amendment,3 for example, would sufﬁce to
capture the beneﬁts I’ve just outlined. Today, however, with price stability
achieved, I think a numerical range is deﬁnitely preferable. Speciﬁcally, our
recent experience with disinﬂation and the proximity of the zero bound on the
funds rate has convinced me that there is little to be gained—and considerable
downside risk—in allowing trend inﬂation to drop below 1 percent. But if
a lower inﬂation bound is warranted, then obviously (at least in my opinion)
there should be an upper bound as well. For me, a 1 to 2 percent inﬂation
target range for the core PCE would be acceptable.
I recognize that introducing an explicit inﬂation target would raise ques-
tions regarding exactly what its operational role would be in implementing
policy. I am conﬁdent, though, that these issues could be addressed without
unduly constraining the FOMC’s traditional short-term stabilization policies.
As I said in the 1995 debate, an inﬂation target “would not prevent the Fed
from taking the kinds of policy actions that we take today to stabilize em-
ployment and output. What it would do (emphasis added) is to discipline us
to justify our short-term actions designed to stabilize output and employment
against our commitment to protect the purchasing power of our currency.” I
stand by that summary of the promise of inﬂation targeting.
2. INTERVENTION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS
(NOVEMBER 15, 1994, FOMC MEETING)
My second example involves the viability of Federal Reserve participation
with the U.S.Treasury in intervention operations in foreign exchange markets
aimed at affecting the value of the U.S. dollar in these markets. A funda-
mental principle here, of course, is that intervention cannot have a sustained
effect on the value of the dollar unless it is supported by basic monetary pol-
icy. Therefore, a problem arises immediately if the policy required to support
a particular external objective for the dollar is inconsistent with the policy
requiredtoachievebroaderdomesticeconomicobjectives. Beyondthis, how-
ever, as I’ll indicate in a moment, intervention can pose problems even where
3 Representative Steve Neal of North Carolina proposed Amendments to the Federal Reserve
Act in 1989, 1991, and 1993 that would have established price stability as the principal objective
of Federal Reserve monetary policy. In the latter two years, the Amendment would have deﬁned
price stability as a condition where “the expected rate of change of the general price level ceases
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there are no direct conﬂicts between the policies required to support domestic
and external objectives.4
In 1994 the Treasury and the Fed intervened frequently and visibly, often
inconjunctionwithforeigncentralbanks. Theseactionsprovokedanextended
discussionoftheFed’sparticipationintheseoperationsattheNovember1994
FOMC meeting. As the transcripts indicate, there was considerable disagree-
ment among Committee members regarding the relative beneﬁts and costs of
this participation.
The comments I made in this discussion were guided by the principle that
the Fed’s credibility for low inﬂation is the foundation of effective monetary
policy, and that public conﬁdence in the Fed’s independence in conducting
monetary policy is the foundation of that credibility. Our experience over the
preceding 15 years or more had made clear how difﬁcult it is for the Fed to
establishandmaintaincredibility. Consequently, Ireasonedthatweshouldn’t
allow anything to risk compromising our credibility.
Intervention, it seemed to me, did precisely that. The Fed is clearly the
junior partner with the Treasury in foreign exchange intervention. To be sure,
as a mechanical matter the Fed can follow the Treasury’s lead in interven-
tion operations without compromising its monetary policy independence by
neutralizing the effect of its intervention actions on the funds rate through
offsetting open market operations. There is little evidence, however, that such
“sterilized” interventions can have a sustained effect on the exchange rate un-
lesstheyareseenassignalsofunsterilizedpolicyactionsinthefuture. Conse-
quently, Fed participation in foreign exchange intervention with the Treasury
risks creating doubt regarding whether monetary policy will support domestic
or external objectives, and this confusion can undermine the credibility of the
Fed’s commitment to low inﬂation. I made this case in the November 1994
FOMC discussion. I also reminded the Committee of the high-proﬁle, multi-
nation intervention in June of that year that was widely regarded in the press
(including even non-national newspapers like the Richmond paper) as a fail-
ure. I argued that this kind of harshly negative publicity—even in a case, like
thisone, wherethepolicyimplicationsofthedomesticandexternalobjectives
were not in direct conﬂict—could harm the Fed’s credibility by creating an
impression that the Fed was either unable or unwilling to achieve its policy
goals more generally.
In sum, reasoning in this way, I concluded that the Fed had little, if any-
thing, to gain and much to lose from participating in foreign exchange market
interventions and that doing so would reduce the effectiveness of monetary
policy over time. I therefore recommended at the November 1994 meeting
that the Fed consider withdrawing from these operations, if not immediately,
4 For a review of the issues surrounding foreign exchange market intervention, see Broaddus
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then gradually but persistently in some way. The meeting transcript shows
that, while there was little support for my proposal to disengage, there was
considerablesympathywiththelogicofmyargumentandtheeconomicratio-
nale underlying it. Since that meeting, the FOMC has not formally changed
its policy regarding intervention. But both the Treasury and the Fed have re-
frainedfrominterveninginrecentyears. Circumstanceshavenodoubtplayed
a large role in this apparent reduction in the inclination to intervene, and I
would certainly not claim that my statements in the FOMC meeting played
anysigniﬁcantroleinbringingthisabout. Whateverthereasonforthechange,
however, the absence of these operations lately is clearly consistent with what
economic analysis tells us about how to conduct monetary policy effectively.
3. INTEREST RATE POLICYAND HIGHER TREND
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (MAY 20, 1997, FOMC
MEETING)
From 1986 to 1990, non-farm business productivity grew only about 1.0 per-
cent per year on average, which reﬂected the sustained slowdown in produc-
tivity growth that began in the mid-1970s. Trend productivity growth rose
dramatically, however, in the 1990s; in fact, it tripled to an average of around
2.4 percent annually in the second half of that decade.
In 1996 and 1997, the FOMC began to recognize, along with other eco-
nomic observers, the possibility that trend productivity growth might be un-
dergoingasustainedincrease. Economistsunderstoodthathigherproductivity
growth would hold down inﬂation because it would take time for real wages
to catch up. Unit labor costs would rise more slowly than the prices of ﬁnal
goodsandservicesforatimeandputdownwardpressureoninﬂation, asﬁrms
passed lower costs through to lower prices. Indeed, inﬂation hardly budged
during the long boom in the late 1990s, even though labor markets tightened
considerably. Rising trend productivity growth and the Fed’s credibility for
low inﬂation that I discussed earlier probably account to a considerable extent
for the favorable inﬂation performance.
Theimplicationsofthesedevelopmentsseemedobvious. Aslongasrising
productivity growth kept inﬂation low, the FOMC could refrain from raising
its funds rate target. This was the generally held view when at the May 1997
FOMC meeting I brought up another channel, in addition to the unit labor
cost channel, through which higher trend productivity growth might affect the
choice of an appropriate funds rate target. I was motivated to do so by the
possibility that trend productivity growth might have accelerated, which, as I
just said, was beginning to be contemplated by the Committee.
In my economic statement at that meeting, I outlined this other channel as
follows. I assumed that markets were conﬁdent that the Fed would hold the
line on inﬂation so that inﬂation and inﬂation expectations would be stable.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
How, in this situation, would higher trend productivity growth affect ﬁnancial
marketsandrealinterestrates? Broadly, asIsawit, theimprovedproductivity
trendwouldcauseﬁrmstoexpecthigherfutureearningsandworkerstoexpect
higher future wages. The point I emphasized was that at the then prevailing
level of real interest rates, households and businesses would want to bring
someofthatexpectedincreaseinfutureincomeforwardtothepresent. Work-
ers might want to ﬁx up their homes; ﬁrms might want to invest in new plant
and equipment; and both households and businesses would try to ﬁnance such
expenditures by borrowing against the expected future increases in income.
Because the economy would not yet be producing this higher future income,
however, real interest rates have to rise in order to prevent excessive current
demand for goods and services from emerging. In other words, higher real in-
terest rates would be required in order to raise the prices of goods and services
consumed currently in terms of goods and services foregone in the future so
that households and ﬁrms would be content to wait until the economy had
actually produced the higher expected future output before trying to consume
or invest it. The point was that, even if trend productivity growth were rising,
and this increase reduced the inﬂation risk, real interest rates still needed to
rise to prevent an unsustainable, credit-driven increase in aggregate demand
that could lead to an unsustainable real boom.
MyargumentgotnoresponseduringtheFOMCdiscussion,althoughsub-
sequently several Committee members expressed interest in it. In retrospect,
though, I think the point looks pretty good. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, the
Committee might have done well to raise the funds rate target a little sooner
than it did during the late 1990s boom. A somewhat more preemptive tight-
ening of policy might have prevented some of the excess investment during
the boom, and therefore the resulting weak investment that helped generate
the recession and—until recently at least—slow the subsequent recovery.
As I indicated at the outset, my assignment today is to illustrate how
economic analysis conditions my thinking about policy. In this particular
case, the analytical result I just summarized, and that I used in the FOMC
discussion, came from the “New Neoclassical Synthesis” macromodel we use
attheRichmondFedtothinkaboutmonetarypolicy.5 This“NNS”modelhasa
real business cycle core that integrates growth and ﬂuctuations, and it also has
sticky prices that allow monetary policy to play a role in stabilizing inﬂation
and employment. In this framework, it’s easy to see the implications of an
increase in trend productivity growth for interest rate policy. In particular,
one can consider two NNS economies, where both have stable prices and full
employment, and where consumption, investment, and output are all growing
at the same rate as productivity. The only difference is that in one economy
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productivity is growing more rapidly than the other. The model shows that, in
balanced growth equilibrium, the faster growing economy must have a higher
real interest rate. If the central bank in this economy does not recognize this
and holds real short rates below the equilibrium rate, borrowing and spending
will exceed potential output in the short run and create an unsustainable boom
in consumption, investment, and employment. The model cannot predict
exactly how the boom will collapse if the central bank holds short-term rates
too low for too long. It may end with accelerating inﬂation. Alternatively,
where—as in the current cycle—the Fed has credibility for low inﬂation, it
could end in recession accompanied by disinﬂation.
4. CONCLUSION
I hope these examples have illustrated reasonably clearly how at least one
policymaker has used economic analysis in developing and arguing mone-
tary policy positions in recent years. In particular, I hope the examples have
suggested the scope of the opportunity for modern analytical tools to improve
policy. Mostimportantly,Ihopethisdiscussionhashelpedunderlinethepoint
I made at the outset: that while carefully monitoring incoming data and the
evolution of the near-term outlook for the economy is an essential component
of successful policymaking, it absolutely must be accompanied by solid eco-
nomic analysis based on high quality research if monetary policy is to be as
effective as it can be. I believe this need is well understood by my FOMC col-
leagues, and while this recognition may not have produced optimal monetary
policy, I think it’s deﬁnitely improved policy over the last two decades.
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